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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Latneau argued that the no contact order which 
prevents him from contacting his children is invalid because the district court failed to 
advise him that it could be ordered as a direct consequence of his guilty plea. 
Mr. Latneau also argued that the district court violated both his procedural and 
substantive due process rights because the no contact order unduly restricts his 
fundamental right to parent. 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Latneau failed to establish fundamental 
error in regard to his guilty plea because the no contact order was merely a collateral 
consequence of the no contact order. Additionally, the State argued that Mr. Latneau 
failed to establish fundamental error in regard to his due process rights because he is 
unable to exercise his parental rights from prison and the district court said it would 
modify the no contact order to reflect the outcome of Mr. and Mrs. Latneau's divorce 
proceedings. 
In rebuttal, Mr. Latneau argues that the no contact order is a direct consequence 
of his guilty plea because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that no contact orders 
entered as part of the sentencing proceedings are part of the criminal sentence. 
Concerning his due process arguments, Mr. Latneau can exercise his parental rights 
because he is on parole. Moreover, even if he were not on parole, inmates can 
exercise a panoply of parental rights while in prison. Further, the fact that the no 
contact order is subject to future modification is irrelevant because the no contact order 
is currently infringing on Mr. Latneau's fundamental right to parent. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
After the Appellant's Brief and the Respondent's Brief were filed, the district court 
entered an order quashing the no-contact order in part. 1 From the face of that order, 
however, it appears that it is only applicable to the victim, Breena Latneau, and it does 
not affect the no contact order as it relates to Mr. Latneau's children. Therefore, the 
order quashing the no-contact order does not alter any of the issues on appeal. 
Additionally, the Idaho Department of Corrections web page indicates that 
Mr. Latneau is currently on parole.2 Due to this development, Mr. Latneau is 
withdrawing the third issue raised in the Appellant's Brief. 
Otherwise, the statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Latneau's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 The Order Granting Motion to Quash No-Contact Order is not in the appellate record. 
Accordingly, a motion to augment has been filed concurrently herewith. 
2 Mr. Latneau's parole status can be found by searching with his offender number, 
97395, at https://www.accessidaho.org/public/corr/offenderlsearch.html. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court's failure to advise Mr. Latneau that a no contact order 
prohibiting his contact with his children could be entered as a direct consequence 
of his guilty plea render the no contact order invalid? 
2. Did the district court violate Mr. Latneau's procedural and substantive due 
process rights when it entered a no contact order which unduly restricts his 
fundamental right to parent? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction 
following Mr. Latneau's rider?3 




The District Court's Failure To Advise Mr. Latneau That A No Contact Order Prohibiting 
His Contact With His Children Could Be Entered As A Direct Consequence Of His Guilty 
Plea Rendered The No Contact Order Invalid 
A. Introduction 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11 requires a district court to warn a defendant about the 
direct consequences of a guilty plea. I.C.R. 11 (c)(2). Mr. Latneau argued, in his 
Appellant's Brief, that his plea was invalid, as to the no contact order, because it was a 
direct consequence of his guilty plea and he was never advised at the change of plea 
hearing about the possibility of the no contact order. (Appellant's Brief, ppA-5.) 
Mr. Latneau then argued that the appropriate remedy is to vacate the no contact order. 
(Appellant's Brief, ppA-5.) 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Latneau's failure to object to the no 
contact order prevents him from raising the issue on appeal because it does not 
constitute fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, ppA-7.) In support of this position, 
the State argues that the district court's failure to advise Mr. Latneau about the 
possibility of the no contact order did not violate Mr. Latneau's Constitutional rights 
because it was a collateral consequence of his guilty plea. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-
6.) The State also argues that the error was not clear because no case establishes that 
the possibility of a no contact order is the direct consequence of a plea. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.7.) The State goes on to argue that Mr. Latneau was not prejudiced because 
there is no evidence indicating that Mr. Latneau would not have pleaded guilty had he 
known about the possibility of the no contact order. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) 
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Mr. Latneau has established fundamental error, and more specifically, the no 
contact order is a direct consequence of Mr. Latneau's guilty pleas because the district 
court has total discretion to issue the no contact order and the Idaho Supreme Court 
has expressly held that a no contact order entered at sentencing is part of the sentence. 
In reliance on that case, Mr. Latneau also argues that the district court's error was clear 
as a matter of law. The State prejudice argument is without merit because it focuses on 
the change of plea hearing when the inquiry should be focused on the outcome of the 
rider review hearing because Mr. Latneau could not have objected to the request for the 
no contact order until the rider review hearing. 
B. The District Court's Failure To Advise Mr. Latneau That A No Contact Order 
Prohibiting His Contact With His Children Could Be Entered As A Direct 
Consequence Of His Guilty Plea Rendered The No Contact Order Invalid 
The State argues that Mr. Latneau must establish fundamental error before an 
appellate court in Idaho will evaluate his claim that the district court's no contact order is 
invalid because the court's failure to advise him about the possibility of the no contact 
order, when he entered his guilty plea. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-7.) In order to 
establish fundamental error a defendant must demonstrate that: 
[O]ne or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were 
violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and 
(3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected 
the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
On the first prong of the fundamental error standard, the State argues that 
Mr. Latneau's Constitutional rights were not violated because the possibility of the no 
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contact order is a collateral consequence of his plea, and Mr. Latneau need only be 
informed of the direct consequences of his guilty plea in order for his plea to be 
considered knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) In support 
of its position, the State relies on State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95 (2007). In that case, 
the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the following three factor test used to determine 
whether a consequence of a guilty is direct or collateral: "(1) the defendant's power to 
prevent the consequence; (2) the punitive or remedial nature of the consequence; and 
(3) the amount of control the sentencing judge has over imposing the consequence." Id. 
at 97-98. 
While addressing the first factor, the State argues that Mr. Latneau can control 
the consequences of the no contact order because the district court stated that the no 
contact order was subject to the terms of Mr. and Mrs. Latneau's prospective divorce 
proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State's argument is without merit because 
the "amount of control" discussion focuses on whether Mr. Latneau has done something 
which requires the district court to enter the no contact order. See Heredia, 144 Idaho 
at 97 ("The 'power to prevent' analysis infers that where a possible consequence is 
within the defendant's power to prevent, such as persistent violator status, it is collateral 
to a guilty plea"). The fact that the no contact order is potentially subject to future 
modification is a red herring and entirely irrelevant to the analysis of whether the initial 
entry of the no contact order was direct consequence of the guilty plea. If the State's 
argument was correct then the indeterminate portion of a sentence could be considered 
a collateral consequence of a guilty plea because it is subject to subsequent 
modification by the parole board. In fact, the entire sentence could be considered 
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collateral because it was subject to modification by an I.C.R. 35 motion. Here, 
Mr. Latneau as very little control over the divorce proceedings, especially since his wife 
can go forward with the proceedings over Mr. Latneau's objection. 
The State argues that the no contact order is a not punitive and remedial in 
nature because it is intended to protect victims and provides criminal penalties for future 
violations. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) The State's position is without merit because, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that no contact orders issued at sentencing are actually 
part of the sentence. In State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71 (2002) (overruled on other 
grounds in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889 (2011)), 
one of the issues on appeal was whether a magistrate judge had the authority to issue a 
permanent no contact order as part of the sentence for disturbing the peace?" Id. at 74 
(emphasis added). That issue dealt with a magistrate's ruling "that Idaho Code § 18-
920( 1) authorizes the issuance of a permanent no contact order as part of the 
punishment for any criminal offense." Id. (emphasis added). On appeal, the State 
argued "the statute authorized the issuance of a permanent no contact order as an 
additional criminal penalty in any case in which a person was charged either with one of 
the listed offenses or with an offense for which the trial court finds that a no contact 
order is appropriate." Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court ruled that the 
permanent no court was invalid, because, under a prior version of I.C. § 18-920(1), no 
contact orders could only be issued as part of a pretrial release, and therefore, could not 
be issued as part of a sentence. Id. at 74-75. The Supreme Court's ultimate holding 
was as follows: 
For the above reasons, we hold that Idaho Code § 18-920(1), as it existed 
at the time of the offense in this case, provided only for the issuance of a 
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no contact order as a condition of pre-trial release. Because Jeppesen has 
successfully served his period of probation, it would serve no purpose to 
remand this case for the magistrate judge to determine whether a no 
contact order should be a condition of Jeppesen's probation. A sentence 
that is in excess of that authorized by law is valid to the extent that the 
court had the jurisdiction and authority to impose it, and is void as to the 
excess if the valid portion is severable from that portion which is void. We 
therefore simply vacate the no contact order. 
Id. at 75. The Court's reasoning for vacating the no contact order was based on its 
determination that the no contact order was a constituent part of the sentence and the 
remaining part of the sentence was valid. Therefore, the court vacated the no contact 
order as an invalid portion of the sentence. Since Mr. Latneau's no contact order was 
order at sentencing, it is punitive in nature because it is actually part of Mr. Latneau's 
sentence. 
Concerning the third factor, the amount of discretion a sentencing judge has over 
the consequence, the State argues, "although the district court has some discretion in 
imposing the order the court effectively delegated the ultimate decision of contact to the 
divorce court." (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) However, the State's argument is 
inconsistent with the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Heredia, where it stated, "the 
'amount of control' discussion by the Court infers that where a judge has no control over 
a consequence, such as mandatory registration on the sex offender watch list, it is 
collateral to a guilty plea." Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97. Here, the district court has total 
discretion, as opposed to the State's assertion of "some discretion," to impose a no 
contact order. See I.C. § 18-920(1). 
Additionally, the actions of the divorce court have no bearing on the district 
court's initial determination to enter the no contact order. Although the district court said 
it would modify the no contact order in accordance with the terms of the divorce decree, 
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the court did not relinquish its jurisdiction over the no contact order. In fact, the district 
court stated, "[i]f a divorce decree determines otherwise then we can come back and 
modify that no contact order." (12/21/10 Tr., p.27, Ls.19-21.) Since the district court 
used the phrase "we can come back and modify," it is clear that the district court 
controls the no contact order. However, if the district court disagrees with the 
conclusion of the divorce court, it is not required, and cannot be compelled, to modify 
the no contact order. 
On the second prong of the fundamental error standard, the State argues that 
Mr. Latneau has not established that the error is clear as a matter of law because 
Mr. Latneau has not cited to a case holding that the possibility of a no contact order is a 
direct consequence of a plea. (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) In light of Jeppesen's holding, 
that a no contact order is part of a sentence, Mr. Latneau has clearly established that 
the no contact order is a direct consequence of his plea. 
The State also argues that Mr. Latneau has failed to establish clear error on the 
record because additional evidence would be necessary to establish that the lack of an 
objection was not tactical and Mr. Latneau had an incentive to not challenge the validity 
of the guilty plea to avoid undoing the plea. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6.) Contrary to the 
State's position, had Mr. Latneau objected to the no contact order at the rider review 
hearing, Mr. Latneau's remedy would not undo the plea agreement. As stated in the 
Appellant's Brief, in instances where an otherwise voluntary and intelligently made plea 
was entered, and one of the direct consequences of the plea deemed invalid, the 
appropriate remedy is to strike that consequence from the sentence. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.5 (citing State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 573 (1993).) Here, the State requested the 
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no contact order for the first time at the rider review hearing. (12/21/10 Tr., p. 11, Ls.18-
20.) Had Mr. Latneau objected to the no contact order, and prevailed on that objection, 
Mr. Latneau's remedy would not have been withdrawal of his plea. Instead, the district 
court would not have entered the order. 4 Therefore, there was no strategic reason to 
avoid objecting at the rider review hearing, because the remedy he would have received 
at that hearing is the same remedy we would receive on direct appeal. 
The State also argues that the error was not clear because Mr. Latneau failed to 
prove he was ignorant of the possibility of a no contact order even though the district 
court's failure to inform him functions as a prima facie showing that the plea is invalid. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) The State's position is illogical. If Mr. Latneau made a 
prima facie showing that his plea was invalid, it would be illogical to require him to 
provide additional facts to support his prima facie showing. It would be more logical to 
shift the burden on the State and require it to prove a fact that rebuts the prima facie 
showing. 
Additionally, the State's position is not supported by I.C.R. 11 (c), which requires 
that the record demonstrate that the defendant was informed of the direct 
consequences of the plea. The language contained in I.C.R. 11 (c) follows: 
4 Had Mr. Latneau objected to the no contact order based on a theory that the State 
breached its plea agreement, and had he prevailed on that issue, the appropriate 
remedy would have been either specific performance of the agreement or withdrawal of 
his plea. State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 411 (Ct. App. 2003). In Doe, the State was 
deemed to breach the plea agreement by recommending restitution. Id. Since, Doe 
had completed his sentence, the Court of Appeals said it would be unjust to have Doe 
withdraw his plea and possibly be tried and resentenced for the same offense. Id. So 
the Court required specific performance and reversed the restitution order. Id. 
Therefore, there would have been no strategic reason to avoid objecting on this basis 
because Mr. Latneau could elect for specific performance and avoid withdrawing his 
plea. 
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(c) Acceptance of Plea of Guilty. Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the 
record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, must show: 
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, 
including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct 
consequences which may apply. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 11 (c) requires that the record demonstrate that Mr. Latneau was 
informed about the possibility of the no contact order. Here, the record does not 
establish that Mr. Latneau was informed about the possibility of a no contact order. 
Since Mr. Latneau has made his prima facie showing that his plea was invalid, which 
comports with I.C.R. 11 (c), it should be the State's burden to establish that he did in fact 
understand that a no contact order could be ordered as a consequence of his plea. 
Concerning the third prong of the fundamental error standard, the State argues 
that Mr. Latneau was not prejudiced because there is no reason to believe knowledge of 
the no contact order would have changed his plea, and, therefore, there is no reason to 
believe the district court's failure to warn him about the possibility of the no contact 
order would have changed the outcome of the proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, p.?) 
The State's focus on changing the outcome of the plea negations and the change of 
plea hearing is misplaced because Mr. Latneau could not have objected to the alleged 
error until the rider review hearing. Therefore, the real question is whether the error 
changed the outcome of the rider review hearing, not the change of plea hearing. In 
that regard, the fact that the no contact order was entered is prejudicial because 
Mr. Latneau can neither communicate nor have any other form of a relationship with his 
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children. Therefore, the prejudice occurred at the rider review hearing when the district 
court entered of the no contact order. 
In sum, Mr. Latneau has established that the district court's failure to inform him 
about the possible consequences of his guilty plea constitutes fundamental error 
because the no contact order is actually part of his sentence and is, therefore, a direct 
consequence of his guilty plea. Since Jeppesen, supra, establishes that the no contact 
order is part of the sentence, that error is clear. Mr. Latneau was prejudiced because 
he was ambushed at the rider review hearing with the State's recommendation for a no 
contact order and he currently is precluded from having any contact with his children. 
II. 
The District Court Violated Mr. Latneau's Procedural And Substantive Due Process 
Rights When It Entered A No Contact Order Which Unduly Restricts His Fundamental 
Right To Parent 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Latneau argued that the district court's no contact 
order was tantamount to an order terminating his fundamental right to parent. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.6-15.) Mr. Latneau then argued the district court infringed on his 
procedural due process rights when it failed to provide him notice and a hearing before 
entering the no contact order. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-13.) Mr. Latneau also argued 
that the no contact order implicates his substantive due process rights and, therefore, 
strict scrutiny applies, which requires that the no contact order be narrowly tailored to 
meet both the State's interest in protecting the children and Mr. Latneau's parental 
rights. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) Mr. Latneau then submitted that the no contact 
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order could have struck this balance by allowing Mr. Latneau supervised visitation with 
his children. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.) 
In response, the State argues that Mr. Latneau's procedural due process rights 
were not violated because the no contact order is limited in time and scope and 
because it will be modified based on the outcome of the divorce proceedings. The 
State also argues that Mr. Latneau's substantive due process claim fails because he 
never carefully described the right to parent. 
In rebuttal, Mr. Latneau argues that a seven year no contact order does prevent 
him from exercising his parental rights and that the assumption that the divorce 
proceedings will lead to an alteration of the no contact order does not remedy the fact 
the no contact order was entered without any procedural protections. Mr. Latneau also 
argues that the right to parent has been firmly established as a fundamental right and 
that the careful description requirement is only applicable when a party is trying to 
establish a new fundamental liberty interest, i.e., one which has not been previously 
recognized. 
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Latneau's Procedural And Substantive Due 
Process Rights When It Entered A No Contact Order Which Unduly Restricts 
His Fundamental Right To Parent 
The State asserts that Mr. Latneau's due process claims do not amount to 
fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-12.) On the first prong of the fundamental 
error analysis, the State specifically argues that Mr. Latneau failed to establish his 
parental rights were terminated because "[t]he no contact order is limited in time and 
scope, with the court specifically exempting from the no contact order any contact 
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allowed in the divorce action between [Mr. Latneau] and his children. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.9-11.) 
This argument is without merit because Mr. Latneau's right to parent, which 
includes the ability to communicate with his children, was immediately infringed upon by 
the entry of the no contact order. See Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 525-526 (2006) 
(visitation rights to one's children are a subset of a parent's general custodial rights); 
see also Matter of Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 104 (1975) (implicitly holding that visitation 
rights include a right to communicate) (superseded by statute on unrelated grounds). 
As argued in Section I(B), supra, the State's position assumes that the district court 
abdicated its control over the no contact order to the divorce court. However, no such 
abdication occurred and the district court has yet to modify the no contact order to 
enable Mr. Latneau to have contact with his children. Moreover, there is no guarantee 
the district court will modify the no contact order in the event the divorce proceedings 
are abandoned or if the divorce decree provides Mr. Latneau with legal and/or physical 
custodial rights. A continued infringement of Mr. Latneau's right to parent should not be 
upheld based on a speculative statement that at some point in time it might be 
remedied. 
The State does accurately point out that the no contact order is limited in time 
and scope. (Respondent's Brief, p.9.) However, those facts do not alter any of the due 
process analysis contained in the Appellant's Brief because it is in effect for 
approximately seven years. (R., p.58.) 
Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has provided general guidance pertaining 
to the various due process concerns which are raised when a temporary no contact 
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order inhibits parental rights. In Eflibee v. Eflibee, 121 Idaho 501 (1992), Mrs. Ellibee 
alleged that Mr. Ellibee had physically abused their son and requested an ex parte order 
restraining Mr. Ellibee from having any contact with their children. !d. at 502. A hearing 
was scheduled and both parties were represented by counsel. !d. After evidence was 
presented, the magistrate entered a ninety day no contact order pursuant to the 
Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act (hereinafter, DVCPA), I.C. § 39-6301 et seq. 
!d. The order provided Mrs. Ellibee with temporary custody of the couple's children, and 
provided Mr. Ellibee with supervised visitation rights. !d. Mr. Ellibee appealed to the 
district court and, after the district court affirmed the magistrate's order, he appealed to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. !d. 
On appeal, one of the issues before the court was the applicable standard of 
proof in a protection order proceedings because the DVCPA did not specify a standard. 
!d. at 505. Mr. Ellibee argued, in reliance on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), 
that the standard of proof should be clear and convincing "because his fundamental 
liberty interest as a natural parent was being circumscribed." !d. In rejecting 
Mr. Ellibee's position, the Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that the applicable standard 
of proof "reflects the weight ascribed to competing interests, and it embodies a societal 
judgment about how the risk-fact finding error should be allocated." !d. (quoting 
Hofmeister v. Bauer, 110 Idaho 960, 963 (Ct. App. 1986». The Court then held: 
The risk of fact-finding error in the case at hand is less likely than where 
actual termination of parental rights is concerned. This is a given due to 
the relatively short duration of any court order restricting contact by a 
parent. The protection order at issue before this Court temporarily 
modified [Mr. Ellibee's] custody rights; it did not terminate either his 
parental rights or his custody rights. 
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In the present situation, the custody restriction is limited to no more than 
ninety days in duration; in fact, a permanent change in custody is not 
obtainable under the Domestic Violence Act. Considering the need for 
prompt relief, and the fact that the preponderance of the evidence 
standard is adequate in instances of permanent alteration of custody 
rights, the preponderance of the evidence is certainly a sufficiently 
demanding standard to protect the due process rights of a respondent in a 
case of short-term custody restriction. [Mr. Ellibee] was given notice of the 
hearing, and was represented by counsel. 
Id. at 505-506. (original emphasis). While the Idaho Supreme Court did not think clear 
and convincing evidence was an appropriate standard, the reasons for its rejection 
provides guidance in this matter. The Supreme Court did consider the issuance of the 
no contact order as a disruption of Mr. Ellibee's parental rights. 5 That conclusion rebuts 
that State's assertion that the no contact order does not infringe on Mr. Latneau's 
parental rights. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) The Supreme Court also noted that 
Mr. Ellibee was provided with notice of the hearing and was represented by counsel. 
Implicit in that factual finding, is that the basic requirements of due process, notice and 
a hearing, are necessary when parental rights are at issue. 
However, there are glaring differences between the no contact order in Ellibee 
and the no contact order entered against Mr. Latneau which demand heightened due 
process protections for Mr. Latneau. Mr. Latneau's no contact order lasts for seven 
years as opposed to ninety days and Mr. Latneau cannot communicate with his children 
5 Mr. Latneau recognizes that the Supreme Court drew a distinction between custodial 
rights and parental rights in Ellibee, when it stated "[t]he protection order at issue before 
this Court temporarily modified [Mr. Ellibee's] custody rights; it did not terminate either 
his parental rights or his custody rights." Ellibee, 121 Idaho at 505. (original emphasis). 
However, this distinction is meaningless in light of the United State's Supreme Court's 
ruling in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), where it was held that the right to 
parent "is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental interests recognized," and includes "the 
interests of the parents in the care, custody, and control of their children .... " 
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outside of legal proceedings. (R., p.58.) With those distinctions in mind, the no contact 
order entered against Mr. Ellibee only modified his custody rights because he retained 
the ability to have supervised visits with his children, even though his son was the victim 
of the domestic violence.6 Due to these differences, Mr. Latneau's no contact order is 
more like an order terminating parental rights, as opposed to Mr. Ellibee's no contact 
order which is akin to an order temporarily altering his custodial rights. Due to this 
difference, Mr. Latneau should have been afforded the heightened due process 
protections provided to parents during termination proceedings. 
Additionally, one of the most important distinctions between the procedures 
utilized in Ellibee and those in this case, is that Mr. Ellibee was provided with notice and 
a hearing. On the other hand, Mr. Latneau was not provided with notice and a hearing 
because he was ambushed by the State's request for the no contact order at the rider 
review hearing. See Banuelos, 124 Idaho at 573 (defendant's due process rights were 
violated as the defendant was not provided notice or a meaningful opportunity to 
respond to the State's motion for restitution because it was filed one day before the 
sentencing hearing). Mr. Latneau was not provided notice and a hearing, and the fact 
that the no contact order was requested at the rider review hearing did not afford 
Mr. Latneau the time to prepare a defense to that request. While dealing with different 
facts, the United States Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires "a hearing when the issue at stake is the 
6 In this matter, Mr. Latneau's children were not the victims of the domestic abuse. 
(R., pp.23-24.) 
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dismemberment of a [parent's] family." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657-658 
(1972). 
The State has also argued that Mr. Latneau's procedural due process rights were 
not violated because the no contact order might be modified, at some point to reflect the 
results of the divorce proceedings and Mr. Latneau will be provided due process 
protections during those proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-11.) Contrary to the 
State's position, a divorce action cannot function as a substitute for parental termination 
proceedings. First, the factors used to determine legal and physical custody in a 
divorce proceeding are different from the factors used in a termination proceeding. 
Idaho Code Section 32-717 contains the following factors which are used in a divorce 
proceeding: 
(1) In an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment, give 
such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the 
marriage as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the 
children. The court shall consider all relevant factors which may include: 
(a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or her custody; 
(b) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian; 
(c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent 
or parents, and his or her siblings; 
(d) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; 
(e) The character and circumstances of all individuals involved; 
(f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child; and 
(g) Domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether 
or not in the presence of the child. 
The following factors are used in a termination proceeding: 
(1) The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where it finds 
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that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child and 
that one (1) or more of the following conditions exist: 
(a) The parent has abandoned the child. 
(b) The parent has neglected or abused the child. 
(c) The presumptive parent is not the biological parent of the child. 
(d) The parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities and such 
inability will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period and will be 
injurious to the health, morals or well-being of the child. 
(e) The parent has been incarcerated and is likely to remain incarcerated 
for a substantial period of time during the child's minority. 
I.C. § 16-2005. While somewhat interrelated, these separate factors require different 
inquiries. In the divorce action, the main focus appears to be on the wishes and 
interests of the child and only one factor focuses on a parent's fitness as a parent. 
Additionally, the divorce court does not have to make any factual findings when 
determining custody and custodial decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 455 (2003). Conversely, the termination 
statute focuses on the fitness of the parent and requires factual findings which are 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. I.C. § 16-2009. Due to those differences 
and the other procedural protections provided in the termination statute and identified in 
the Appellant's Brief (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-13), the extent of Mr. Latneau's no contact 
order and his concomitant parental rights are not appropriately determined in divorce 
court proceedings. See also Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842 (N.D. 1976) (holding 
that divorce proceedings cannot replace termination proceedings for an unwed father 
because too many due process questions would arise). 
Additionally, a unique due process problem arises when the no contact order 
precedes either a divorce action or an actual termination action, because the no contact 
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order can be used against Mr. Latneau in those proceedings. For example, in divorce 
proceedings one of the factors listed in the statue includes the amount of interaction 
between the child and the parent. I.C. § 32-717(1 )(c). In termination proceedings: 
In cases where the parent is incarcerated, we will consider several factors 
in determining whether termination is in a child's best interests including, 
among other things, the nature and circumstances of the offense that led 
to incarceration, prior charged or uncharged criminal behavior while in the 
home, previous incarcerations and rehabilitations, the impact incarceration 
has had on the child's well-being, and the quality of contacts or efforts 
made by the parent to keep a meaningful relationship with the child. 
Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 151 Idaho 605,611 (Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis 
added). Under circumstances like Mr. Latneau's, where a no contact order is entered 
prior to divorce or termination proceedings, the parent's inability to communicate with 
his/her children can be used as a justification to either deny custody or terminate 
parental rights. The use of a no contact order not only caused an immediate 
infringement on Mr. Latneau's parental rights, but it also caused other due process 
problems because it can be used against him in future proceedings.? 
The State also argues that Mr. Latneau's Constitutional rights were no violated 
because his conviction for domestic violence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
which refutes any claim that the State failed to establish he was an unfit parent by the 
lower clear and convincing standard. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-10.) The fact that 
Mr. Latneau pleaded guilty to domestic violence does not in and of itself mean he is an 
unfit parent. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (the right to parent 
? The State also argues that Mr. Latneau failed to argue that he is a fit parent. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9.) Mr. Latneau asserts that he is a fit parent. Moreover, 
Mr. Latneau's fitness as a parent has never been litigated or otherwise determined. In 
fact, the State's argument only highlights the district court's infringement of 
Mr. Latneau's procedural due process rights. 
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"does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents . . .. Even 
when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the 
irretrievable destruction of their family life"). While it would be appropriate for a court to 
use Mr. Latneau's conviction for domestic violence against him in termination 
proceedings, the termination statue requires a factual finding beyond a single criminal 
conviction. Specially, the termination statute requires a district court to find that 
termination is in the best interest of the child and find another factor enumerated in 
I.C. § 16-2005. Those two factual findings would have to be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. I.C. § 16-2009. Even in the context of divorce proceedings, the 
fact that a parent has been convicted of domestic violence is only one of the seven 
factors used to determine custody. I.C. § 32-717. Mr. Latneau's conviction for domestic 
violence alone does not satisfy the procedural requirements necessary to terminate his 
parental rights. 
The State also argues that Mr. Latneau's substantive due process argument is 
without merit because Mr. Latneau "failed to provide a careful description of his 
fundamental right," and failed to establish "that such right was infringed by government 
action not narrowly tailored to the governmental interest." (Respondent's Brief, p.10.) 
In support of that assertion that State argues that U[t]here is no reason to believe that 
Mr. Latneau will have visitation in prison and he has not established a right to visitation 
beyond the scope of any eventual divorce decree." (Respondent's Brief, p.10) The 
State's position is without merit because it confuses the distinction between establishing 
the existence of a right with Mr. Latneau's actual ability to exercise that right. In support 
of its argument, the State cites to Washington v. G/ucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). The 
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issue in that case was whether the substantive due process protection should be 
expanded to include a fundamental right to assisted suicide. Id. at 705-705, 719-736. 
While addressing this issue, United States Supreme Court began its analysis by 
identifying the following rights as firmly established fundamental rights: 
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and 
the "liberty" it protects includes more than the absence of physical 
restraint. The Clause also provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests. In a long line of cases. we have held that. in addition to the 
specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights. the "liberty" specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry; to have 
children; to direct the education and upbringing of one's children; to 
marital privacy; to use contraception; to bodily integrity, and to abortion. 
We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process 
Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical 
treatment. 
Id. at 719-720 (emphasis added). After the court identified the right to parent as one of 
the previously established fundamental rights, it set forth the following standards which 
apply when a party is advocating for the recognition of an additional fundamental right: 
But we "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of 
substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended. By 
extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, 
we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate 
and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," lest the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the Members of this Court. 
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has 
two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due 
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties 
which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 
and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Second. we have required in 
substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted 
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fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and 
practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking," that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due 
Process Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, 8 the Fourteenth 
Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty 
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 
Id. at 720-721 (citations omitted) (underlined emphasis added) (italicized emphasis in 
original). When a party is advocating for a "new" fundamental right one of their tasks is 
to provide a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Here, 
Mr. Latneau is not advocating for this Court to identify a new fundamental liberty 
interest, instead, he is identifying an infringement of the fundamental right to parent 
which was identified as a fundamental right in Glucksberg. See also Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("The liberty interest at issue in this case-the interest of parents 
in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."). Had Mr. Latneau been 
advocating for this Court to recognize a new fundamental right, he would then have the 
burden of carefully describing that right, however, that is not the case here. Therefore, 
the State's argument that Mr. Latneau has failed to clearly identify the right he is 
asserting, is specious and belied by the State's own authority. 
The State also argues that Mr. Latneau has no ability to exercise his parental 
rights because he is incarcerated. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) However, 
Mr. Latneau is currently on parole,g which means his custody is no longer a factor. 
Assuming that Mr. Latneau was currently incarcerated, there are many means he could 
8 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
9 Mr. Latneau's parole status can be found by searching with his offender number, 
97395, at https://www.accessidaho.org/public/corr/offender/search.html. 
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employ to communicate with his children; he could write to his children, he could speak 
with his children over the telephone, and his children could visit him in prison. 
Mr. Latneau could also exercise parental rights in prison beyond visitation rights, such 
as providing input in medical, contractual, and educational. In fact, Mr. Latneau could 
exercise a panoply of parental rights from prison. 
Turning to the second prong of the fundamental error standard, the State argues 
that Mr. Latneau has not cited "to any case which providing that he is entitled to the 
level of process he claims under circumstances even arguably similar to his own." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Contrary to the State's assertion, the Ellibee opinion, supra, 
indicates that a similar no contact order does infringe on the right to parent. The Troxel 
and Glucksberg opinions both indicate that the right to parent is fundamental. The 
procedural and substantive due process errors are clear. Mr. Latneau's fundamental 
right to parent has almost been completely severed for a period of seven years, without 
any notice or hearing. 
The State also argues that the error is not clear because the lack of on objection 
could have been a tactical decision because the court allowed Mr. Latneau to litigate his 
parental rights in the divorce court. (Respondent's Brief, p.11.) This argument has no 
merit because the existence of the no contact order would not have provided 
Mr. Latneau any benefits in the divorce proceedings. Moreover, since the amount of 
contact Mr. Latneau has with his children is a factor a divorce court can consider in 
custody proceedings, the existence of the no contact order would only hurt him in a 
divorce proceeding. See I.C. § 32-717. 
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On the last prong of the fundamental error standard, the State repeats its prior 
arguments that Mr. Latneau was not prejudiced because he cannot exercise his 
parental rights in prison and because he can litigate his custody issues in the divorce 
proceedings. These arguments have already been addressed in both Sections I and II 
of this brief and will not be repeated here. However, Mr. Latneau does submit that his 
inability to communicate with his children is severely prejudicial not only to him, but also 
to his children who have had their father abruptly taken away from them. He cannot 
even explain to them why he is gone and why he does not speak with them. The 
psychological damage this no contact order has likely caused his children might be 
irreparable. 
In sum, the fact that Mr. Latneau was incarcerated, and the fact the district court 
said it might modify the no contact order to reflect the outcome of the divorce 
proceedings have no bearing on the fact that Mr. Latneau's fundamental parental rights 
were effectively term inated without any process by the entry of the no contact order. As 
the record currently stands, Mr. Latneau is on parole and the no contact order has been 
quashed in regard to the victim, Mrs. Latneau. However, Mr. Latneau still cannot speak 
with his children. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Latneau respectfully requests that this Court strike the no contact order in 
regard to his children R.L. and C.L. 
DATED this 9th day of May, 2012. 
~7r-
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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